ECON 159: Game Theory
Lecture 07 - Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line. We first consider the alternative "Bertrand" model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than setting quantities. Then we consider a richer model in which firms still set prices but in which the goods they produce are not identical. We model the firms as stores that are on either end of a long road or line. Customers live along this line. Then we return to models of strategic politics in which it is voters that are spread along a line. This time, however, we do not allow candidates to choose positions: they can only choose whether or not to enter the election. We play this "candidate-voter game" in the class, and we start to analyze both as a lesson about the notion of equilibrium and a lesson about politics. (from oyc.yale.edu)
| Lecture 07 - Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line |
| Time | Lecture Chapters |
| [00:00:00] | 1. Bertrand Duopoly: Standard Model |
| [00:28:18] | 2. Bertrand Duopoly: Product Differentiation |
| [00:40:13] | 3. Perfect Competition Revisited: The Candidate Voter Model |
| References |
| Lecture 7 - Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line Instructor: Professor Ben Polak. Resources: Problem Set 3 [PDF]; Discussion of Linear-City Homework [PDF]; Blackboard Notes Lecture 7 [PDF]. Transcript [html]. Audio [mp3]. Download Video [mov]. |
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