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ECON 159: Game Theory

Lecture 02 - Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes. At the start of the lecture, we introduce the "formal ingredients" of a game: the players, their strategies and their payoffs. Then we return to the main lessons from last time: not playing a dominated strategy; and putting ourselves into others' shoes. We apply these first to defending the Roman Empire against Hannibal; and then to picking a number in the game from last time. We learn that, when you put yourself in someone else's shoes, you should consider not only their goals, but also how sophisticated are they (are they rational?), and how much do they know about you (do they know that you are rational?). We introduce a new idea: the iterative deletion of dominated strategies. Finally, we discuss the difference between something being known and it being commonly known. (from oyc.yale.edu)

Lecture 02 - Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes

Time Lecture Chapters
[00:00:00] 1. Recap of Previous Lecture: Prisoner's Dilemma and Payoffs
[00:06:47] 2. The Formal Ingredients of a Game
[00:16:01] 3. Weakly Dominant Strategies
[00:35:29] 4. Rationality and Common Knowledge
[01:05:37] 5. Common Knowledge vs. Mutual Knowledge

References
Lecture 2 - Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
Instructor: Professor Ben Polak. Resources: Blackboard Notes Lecture 2 [PDF]. Transcript [html]. Audio [mp3]. Download Video [mov].

Go to the Course Home or watch other lectures:

Lecture 01 - Introduction: Five First Lessons
Lecture 02 - Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
Lecture 03 - Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
Lecture 04 - Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
Lecture 05 - Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
Lecture 06 - Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
Lecture 07 - Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
Lecture 08 - Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
Lecture 09 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
Lecture 10 - Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes
Lecture 11 - Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
Lecture 12 - Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles
Lecture 13 - Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions
Lecture 14 - Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages
Lecture 15 - Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats
Lecture 16 - Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels
Lecture 17 - Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining
Lecture 18 - Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection
Lecture 19 - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments
Lecture 20 - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition
Lecture 21 - Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game
Lecture 22 - Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing
Lecture 23 - Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education
Lecture 24 - Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Course